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Introduction

T

he law of naval warfare is part of the larger bodyoflaw applicable to international armed conflicts.l Accordingly, it applies to an a rmed conflict between
two or more States. including conflicts involving State-sponsored forces. 2 Whether
the law of naval warfare also applies to situations of non -international armed con-

flicts is a contentious issue. Therefore, the distinction between international and
non-international anned conflicts is important when it comes to the applicability
of the law of naval war fare to a particular armed conflict.

Unfortunately, the distinction between international and non-international
armed conflicts is less clear than it seems at first glance. On the one hand, the " facts

on the ground" may make it difficult to draw the line of demarcation between the
two) Additionally, international scholars have taken quite differe nt positions. For
some, the distinctive criterion is the identity of the parties to the conflict, with the
issue being whether or not those parties qualify as States under public internationallaw. 4 For others, it is not the identity of the parties alone, but also the geography of an armed conflict; they are prepared to apply the law appUcable to
international armed conflict to any case in which armed conflict "crosses the borders of the state,"5 even if one of the parties is a non-State actor.6Still others believe
that the distinction has become irrelevant, because, they maintain, the fo nnerly
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separate bodies of law have merged into a single body of law applying equally to
both international and non-international armed conflict.'
Wit h regard to the alleged merger, it is acknowledged that there has been a
remarkable development of the law of non-international armed conflict during
the last decade. Some treaties no longer distinguish between international and
non-international armed confli cts. 6 The concept of war crimes, until recently
strictly limited to international anned conflicts, has been introduced into the law
of non-international armed conflict. 9 Still, it is doubtful whether that development justifies the conclusion that the two bodies of law have merged. First, those
treaties that do not distinguish between international and non-international
armed conflict have not become customary international law. Second, one of the
prime references relied upon by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia when addressing international and non-international armed conflict issues, the German Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts Manual, is under
revision. The ftrst edition did not distinguish between the two; however, the forthcoming second edition will contain a separate section on non-international anned
conflicts. Third, those who advocate a merger focus on the obligations and prohibitions imposed upon the parties to the conflict. In other words, they maintain
that in both international and non -international armed conflict the parties are increasingly bound by the same rules, while ignoring the fact that the law of international armed conflict offers belligerents certain rights, especially vis-a.-vis the
nationals of other States (neutrals). This especially holds true for the law of naval
warfare, which provides for prize measures, blockade and various maritime zones.
It is doubtful that the proponents of merger would be prepared to accept the exercise of the full spectrum of belligerent rights during a non-international armed
conflict, even if exercised only by the State actor.
Those who focus on the identity of the parties to the conflict to determine the
nature of the conflict are correct insofar as a non-international armed conflict presupposes that at least one party to the armed conflict is a non-State actor. This does
not mean, however, that geography is irrelevant. To the contrary, according to
Common Article 3, which appears in each of 1949 Geneva Conventions, the armed
conflict must occur "in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties."lo Article 1( 1) of 1977 Additional Protocol II applies to "all armed conflicts which take
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party." ]] Hence, it cannot be denied
that non-international armed conflict is characterized by a territorial element.
Those who take the position that an international armed conflict comes into existence as soon as there is a trans-border element seem to base that position on a literal reading of the provisions of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol I I.
However, mere "spillover effects" into the territory of another State do not
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necessarily change the character of a non-international armed conflict into that of
an international armed conflict as long as the governments concerned refrain from
hostilities against each other. II
Differences of opinion on how to characterize a conflict increase if the situation
under scrutiny does not easily fit into one of the traditional categories, as, for instance, the armed conflicts in Gaza and in Afghanistan/Pakistan. Very often the
different approaches to distinguishing international from non-international
armed conflicts seem to be guided by desired result rather than by a sober analysis
of customary international law. Although the different characterization approaches are interesting, this article is not designed to provide further criteria of
distinction nor to add yet another category of armed conflict to the existing categories of international and non-international. It starts, therefore, with the premise
that the law of international armed conflict applies
• "whenever there is a resort to armed force between States";i3
• if the non-State actors in a non-international armed conflict obtain recognition of belligerency by the government;14 or
• for States parties to Additional Protocol 1,15 if the conditions of Article l ( 4)
are fulfilled.
In those armed conflicts the law of naval warfare undoubtedly applies, at least
insofar as measures taken by the State party to the conflict are concerned. The nonState party to the conflict may also apply methods and means of naval warfare
against its State enemy. However, the non -State actor may not interfere with neutral shipping unless the neutral State has--either explicitly or implicitly-recognized it as a belligerent.
A non-international armed conflict exists whenever there is "protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State."16The focus of the present article is on the question of whether, and to what extent, the parties to a non-international armed
conflict are entitled to exercise belligerent rights under the law of naval warfare.
The first part gives a short overview of nations' practice involving the use of methods and means of naval warfare during non-international armed conflicts. The second part addresses the question of a geographical limitation of the hostilities. The
third part deals with the conduct of hostilities and the fourth part discusses measures taken by the parties to the conflict that interfere with the shipping and/or aviation of other States. It will be shown that the law of naval warfare can be applied to
non -international armed conflicts, albeit partly modified, between the parties to
the conflict. If, however, the parties interfere with the shipping and/or aviation of
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other States beyond the outer limit of the State party's territorial sea or contiguous
zone, an additional legal basis for the measures in question must be fo und.
Part 1. Practice
A. American Civil War
The blockade during the American Civil War is an im portant example of applying
the law of naval warfare to a non-international armed conflict. It m ust be borne in
mind, however, that the declaration of the blockade by President Abraham Lincoln
was considered as recognition ofbelligerency,17 thus triggering the applicability of
the law of blockade and of the law of naval warfare. Moreover, the British government had proclaimed its neutrality, thus also recognizing a state ofbelligerency between the United States and the Confederate States. IS Accordingly, the
blockade ofthe American Civil War serves as a precedent only in a limited manner
for the general applicability either of the law of blockade or of the law of naval warfare to non-international armed conflicts. Nevertheless, it needs to be emphasized
that, although recognition of belligerency has occurred only infrequently in recent
State practice, it continues to exist as a legal concept. 19 Moreover, as illustrated by
the blockade of the Confederate States, recognition of belligerency may be explicit
or implicit.
B. Spanish Civil War
During the Spanish Civil War ( 1936-39) a nwnber of merchant vessels of various
nationalities supplying the government forces were attacked by aircraft and
submarines. The identity of the State or group to which the attacking aircraft and
submarines belonged is uncertain; however, it is dear that it was not a party to the
conflict.20 In res ponse, nine States, ind uding the United Kingdom and France,
concluded the 1937 Nyon agreements 21 and decided on collective measures against
submarines, surface vessels and aircraft that were, or that were suspected of being,
engaged in unlawful attacks against merchant vessels. For the purposes of the present paper, the treatment of those attacks as "acts of piracy" is unimportant. It
should be noted, however, that the parties to the Nyon Arrangement in the preamble em phasized that they were not "in any way admitting the right of either party to
the conflict in Spain to exercise belligerent rights or to interfere with merchant
ships on the high seas even if the laws of warfare at sea are observed." Therefore, it
is probably correct to state that "despite the scale of hostilities involved and the degree of international intervention on both sides ... , no European state conceded to
any party to the conflict any right to interfere with neutral shipping."22
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C. Algeria
Both prior to and during the conflict between France and Algerian groups seeking
independence, France instituted an extensive maritime control zone in the Mediterranean. Acting under a decree of March 17, 1956,23 the French Navy intercepted
more than 2,500 ships per year24 in an effort to prevent the flow of arms to rebels in
Algeria.25 According to Articles 4 and 5 of that decree, vessels of less than one hundred
tons were liable to visit and search inside the "customs zone" that extended fifty
kilometers off the Algerian coast. 26 After 1958, vessels of more than one hundred
tons were also subjected to visit and search. Whereas most of the measures were
taken within fifty kilometers of the Algerian coast, a number of vessels were visited
well beyond the "customs zone."27 Vessels were diverted when boarding was impossible due to adverse weather conditions or the nature of the cargo, including
cargo consisting o f arms and explosives. In the latter case, the cargo was confiscated unless it was determined that the arms and/or explosives were not to be used
in a manner that constituted a danger to French forces in Algeria.28 In most instances, the ships were released. The French measures that met sharp protests of
the affected flag States were justified by reference to the rights of self-defense and
self-preservation.29
D. Sri lanka
The armed conflict in Sri Lanka (1983-2009) was characterized by a consid erable
naval element. The "Sea Tigers"-the naval wing, which was established in 1984, of
the Tamil Tigers-proved to be a serious threat to government forces . According
to unconfirmed reports, the Sea Tigers deployed small suicide boats and fast patrol
boats that sank twenty-nine governmen t fast patrol boats and attacked naval bases
of the Sri Lankan Navy. The Sea Tigers did not limit their operations to enemy
forces, but also interfered with innocent shipping in the Indian Ocean. As a result,
on May 14, 2007, the Indian Navy announced that it would increase its presence in
the Palk Strait and deploy unmanned aerial vehicles in the region.)O
In December 2004, demands were made in India to neutralize the Sea Tigers because they had become a "credible third naval force in the southern part of South
Asia."3] In 1984 and again in 2009, the Sri Lankan government forces were alleged
to have established naval blockades against parts of the coastline controlled by the
Tamil Tigers. However, those references to naval blockade are misleading. The
measures taken by the government forces in 1984 were indeed aimed at preventing
entry and exit to and from the coastal area, but their main purpose was to prevent
the Tamil Tigers from receiving both training and equipment from the southern
Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Additionally, the m aritime interdiction operations occurred within the Sri Lankan territorial sea and contiguo us zone, and were directed
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against vessels suspected of being engaged in smuggling weapons or supplies to the
Tamil Tigers. The Sri Lankan government did not assert the right to interfere with
all neutral vessels encountered in high seas areas. n The so-called "blockade" of the
Mullaitivu coast in 2009 was part of a major military operation against the headquarters of the Sea Tigers that eventually resulted in its neutralization. Again, the
Sri Lankan armed forces did not claim any right to interfere with neutral shipping.
E. Gaza
On August 13, 2008, the Shipping Authority at the Israeli Ministry of Transport
published a Notice to Mariners calling upon shipping to refrain from entering the
territorial waters off the Gaza coast}3 That measure was considered inadequate,
and was followed on January 3, 2009 by a Minister of Defense-ordered naval
blockade of the coast of the Gaza Strip that extended to a maximum distance of
twenty nautical miles from the coast. The Notice to Mariners advising of the establishment of the blockade provided: "All mariners are advised that as of 03 January
2009,1700 UTC, Gaza maritime area is closed to all maritime traffic and is under
blockade imposed by Israeli Navy until further notice. Maritime Gaza area is enclosed by the following coordinates. . .".34 The notice was published on the
websites of the Israel Defense Force, the Shipping and Ports Authority and the
Ministry of Transport, and on several standard international channels, such as
NA VTEX, an international satellite network that collects and distrib utes notices to
vessels worldwide. Moreover, this notice was b roadcast twice a day on the emergency channel for maritime com munications to vessels that sailed within three
hundred kilometers of the Israeli coast. On May 31, 2010, the so-called "Gaza 00tilla," including the Mavi Marmara, was intercepted. 35

F. Libya
The 20 11 con flict in Libya was a "mixed" con nict. On one hand, it was a noninternational armed conflict between the government forces loyal to Gaddafi and
the rebels. On the other hand, it was an international armed conflict between
Libya and the international alliance that exercised certain belligerent rights on the
basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 .36 For the purposes of this article, it
is irrelevant whether the measures taken by the alliance were in compliance with
the terms of the resolution. During the conflict, NATO warships intercepted several boats operated by Gaddafi forces that were laying anti-shipping mines outside
the harbor of Misurata, a city that was dependent for much of its food and supplies
on the sea link with the rebel capital Benghazi. British Brigadier Rob Weighill, director of NATO operations in Libya, condemned the minelaying by stating: "We
have just seen Gaddafi forces floating anti-ship mines outside Misurata harbour
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today. It again shows his complete disregard for international law and his willingness to attack humanitarian delivery efforts."37
Part II. Region of Operations

A. Internal Waters and Territorial Sea
As non-international armed conflicts occur within a State,}8 the parties to the con-

flict are not prohibited from conducting hostilities in that State's internal waters
and territorial sea, as those are defined by the law of the sea. As long as the parties to
the conflict do not interfere with the navigation of other States, they may apply
methods and means of naval warfare against their adversary in those sea areas.
At the same time, however, other States continue to enjoy the right of innocent
passage. There is no indication in either treaty law or State practice that the right
of innocent passage is automatically suspended at the commencement of a noninternational armed conflict. Rather, the general rules continue to apply. The
coastal State, under Article 25(3) ofthe 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (LOS Convention),39 may in certain circumstances temporarily
suspend innocent passage in specified parts of its territorial sea. To be effective,
the suspension must be "duly published."
The reference to "weapons exercises" in Article 25(3) as a basis fo r suspending
the right of innocent passage is not the exclusive circumstance in which suspension
may occur. The article goes on to indicate that suspension may occur when "essential for the protection of its [the coastal State'sl security." In determining whether
such suspension is essential, the coastal State enjoys a wide margin of discretion. 4o
The existence of a non-international anned conflict certainly constitutes a threat to
the coastal State's security; hence, the authorities of the coastal State are entitled to
suspend the right of innocent passage in order to prevent foreign shipping from
navigating in close vicinity to the conflict area. In view of a lack of conclusive State
practice, it is unclear whether innocent passage m ay be suspended in the entire territorial sea. While suspension in a State's entire territorial sea would appear to be
inconsistent with Article 25(3)'s "in specified areas," the circumstances of a given
non-international armed conflict may be such that the government considers it
necessary to close the entire territorial sea to foreign navigation. If, however, the
armed hostilities are limited to a certain region, it would be difficult for the
government to justify a suspension of the right of innocent passage in coastal sea
areas remote fro m the area of operations.
The non-State party to a non -international armed conflict is not entitled to suspend or otherwise interfere with the right of innocent passage. This clearly follows
from the wording of Article 25(3) ("The coastal State may .. .").41 If the non-State
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party nevertheless takes measures affecting foreign shipping, the authorities of the
coastal State under Article 24(2) must "give appropriate publicity to any danger to
navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its territorial sea. "42 The government
is not obligated to actively take measures with a view to protecting foreign navigation against interference by the non-State party to the conflict.
B. International Straits and Archipelagic Sea Lanes
Neither the government nor, a fortiori, the non-State party to a non-international
armed conflict is entitled to interfere with the rights of transit passage and of
archipelagic sea lanes passage within international straits and archipelagic waters.
Even during an international armed conflict the belligerents are obliged to preserve
those passage rightS.43 There is no indication in State practice that the existence of a
non-international armed conflict would entitle the government to adopt laws and
regulations relating to passage that are in excess of that permissible under the law of
the sea. In particular, there maybe no suspension of transit passage even if the exercise of navigation or overflight were dangerous to the transiting vessel or aircraft.
As is the case with dangers to navigation within the territorial sea, the authorities of
the States bordering an international strait and the archipelagic State are obliged to
give "appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation or overOight."44 And,
again, the government is not obliged to take active measures against the non-State
party to the conflict in order to protect international navigation and aviation.
C. Sea Areas beyond the Territorial Sea
The government of the State concerned is entitled to exercise maritime interdictionlinterception operations within its contiguous zone if the conditions of Article
33 45 of the LOS Convention are met. Hence, the "special naval surveillance zone"
established and enforced by Sri Lankan government forces in 1984 and the measures taken against foreign vessels that were engaged in smuggling weapons and
supplies to the Tamil Tigers were "justified under ordinary customs and policing
powers available within 24 nautical miles of Sri Lanka's baselines."46
State practice seems to provide sufficient evidence that there is no rule of customary international law prohibiting the parties to a non-international armed conflict
from engaging in hostilities against each other in high seas areas. As in an international armed conflict, there is, however, a positive obligation to pay due regard fo r
the rights enjoyed by other States.47 Moreover, the parties are prohibited from
damaging submarine cables and pipelines that do not exclusively serve either party
to the conflict.#
Hostile actions taken within the exclusive economic zone or on the continental
shelf of another State during a non-international conflict are more questionable.
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While the law of international armed conflict contains no prohibition on conducting hostilities in those areas,49 it is doubtful whether this also holds true for
non-international armed conflicts. In view of a lack of conclusive practice, it is not
possible to reach a clear conclusion on that issue. It is, however, safe to state that
measures taken by a non-State party to a non-international armed conflict within
the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of another State will, in all
likelihood, not be tolerated by that State. This certainly will be the case if either
party to the conflict decides to lay naval mines in those areas. If such minelaying
occurs, the coastal State is entitled to remove or otherwise neutralize the mines.

Part 111. Conduct of Naval Hostilities
This section addresses only relations between the parties to a non-international
armed conflict, and not their relations with non-parties. Its object is to determine
which rules of the law of naval warfare are applicable in a non- international armed
conflict by focusing on the rules and principles applicable to the methods and
means of naval warfare .
A. Entitlement
Under the law of international armed conflict, only warships are entitled to
exercise belligerent rights. so Th is r ule goes back to the proh ibition of privateering
under the 1856 Paris Declaration. 51 Warships are those vessels that meet the criteria set forth in Articles 2-5 of the 1907 Hague Convention VII ,52 Article 8(2) of the
1958 High Seas ConventionS3 and Article 29 of the LOS Convention. 54 Limitations
on the exercise of belligerent rights are most important with regard to interference
with neutral navigation and aviation; thus, neutral vessels and aircraft must accede
to such interference only if the measures are taken by warships.
No such limitation applies to non-international anned conflicts vis-a-vis the
parties.55 It follows from the object and purpose of the rule limiting the exercise of
belligerent rights under the law of naval warfare-Le., the transparent ent itlement
of the warship---that the non-State actor will obviously not have ships that meet
the criteria for classification as a warship since one of the cr iteria is that it be a State
vessel. The government forces may make use of any vessel or aircraft , including, fo r
example, those used fo r law enforcement and customs enforcement, in the conduct of hostilities. This may not be the case, however, if the government takes measures against foreign shipping. 1 will return to that issue. 56

219

Methods and Means of Naval Waifare in Non-In ternational Armed Conflicts
B. Lawful Targets
Under the international law of non-international anned conflict, members of the
regular armed forces, dissident armed forces and an organized armed group
formed by the non-State party to a non-international armed conflict are lawful targets. 57The International Committee of the Red Cross's ( ICRe's) Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Dired Participation in Hostilities under Intertlarional
Humanitarian Law provides that members of organized armed groups "consist
only of individuals whose continuous function is to take a direct part in hostilities
('continuous combat function')."58 The Interpretive Guidance provides that "continuous combat function" "requires lasting integration into an organized armed
group acting as the armed forces of a non-State party to an armed conflict."s9 Persons that accompany or support an organized armed group but "who assume exclusively political, administrative or other non-combat functions" are civilians
who have " protection against direct attack unless and for such time as they directly
participate in hostilities."60 Members ofthe regular armed forces, however, regardless of the fun ction they serve] are not considered to be civilians and are subject to
direct attack. This introduction of a double standard is not practicable in the context of armed conflicts. It would have been preferable had the Interpretive Guidance
accepted the conclusion of the ICRe's Customary Intertlational Humanitarian Law
study which rightly states, "Such imbalance would no t exist if members of organized armed groups were, due to their membership, either considered to be continuously taking a direct part in the hostilities or not considered to be civilians. "62
In the context of the Libyan conflict, the Libyan rebels were lawful targets at that
point when the rebellion against the Gaddafi government passed the threshold to
become a non-international armed conflict. They were not protected under Security Council Resolution 1973, which afforded protection to civilians, but not to
members of organized armed groups. Civilians, more generally under the law of
non-international armed conflict, are not subject to direct attack unless (and for
such time as) they take a direct part in hostilities. 61Thus, civilians, who would otherwise have been entitled to protection, who directly participated in the hostilities
by attacking either the Gaddafi or the rebel forces became lawful targets during
their period of participation as well.
When it comes to objects-which are, of course, the focus of naval operationsit is generally agreed that the definition set forth in Article 52(2) of Additional
Protocol I is customary in character and thus applies to both international and
non-international armed conflicts.64 All objects that have an "intrinsic military significance" are to be considered lawful military objectives "by nature."65 Hence, the
military equipment, such as fast patrol boats and ammunition depots, or military
headquarters of either party may be attacked at all times. For instance, the vessels
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used by the Sea Tigers for naval operations, as well as their stronghold in
Mullaitivu, were lawful targets. The same holds true for the military equipment of
the Sri Lankan government forces .66 All other objects, although of a civilian nature,
may become lawful military objectives by either their use, purpose or location.
It follows from the foregoing that civilians and civilian objects may not be directly attacked.67 Moreover, the parties to a non-international armed confli ct are
obliged to always distinguish between members of armed forces or organized
armed groups and civilians, and between military objectives and civilian objects.68
Civilians are those who are neither members of an organized anned group nor
directly participating in the hostilities.69 Civilian objects are objects that do not
constitute a military objective under the customary international law definition. 70
In a non-international armed conflict, it may be difficult to d early establish
whether an individual is a member of an organized armed group or a civilian or
whether an object constitutes a military objective or a civilian object. For instance,
the parties are under no obligation to use vehicles that are marked or otherwise
clearly identifiable as military in nature. This does not render the rules on lawful
targets and the principle of distinction obsolete; it simply increases the difficulty in
applying them.

C. Use of Naval Mines
As was seen in the Libyan conflict, the use of naval mines by the forces loyal to
Gaddafi was condem ned as being in "complete disregard for internationallaw."71
That statement, however, referred to interference with " humanitarian delivery
efforts"; Resolution 1973 required Libyan authorities to "take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded
passage of h umanitarian assistance."72 In the absence of Resolution 1973, it would
have been difficult to condem n the laying of naval mines as a violation ofinternational law or of the law of non-international armed conflict had Libyan authorities
publicized their employment. The mines were laid within the Libyan territorial sea
and their purpose seems to have been to prevent supplies from reaching Misurata
via the sea. Such conduct does not violate the law applicable to non-international
armed conflict. Moreover, it would be difficult to conclude that the laying of naval
mines violated the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks or any specific prohibition
under the law applicable to such weapons or their use.
The fact that the mines were laid within the Libyan territorial sea is not alone
sufficient to deter mine that the establishment of the minefield accorded with the
applicable international law, however. A minefield certainly impedes upon the
right of innocent passage. As was seen earlier, any suspension of the r ight of innocent passage requires prior notification, e.g., by issuing a Notice to Mariners.73
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Libyan authorities neither publicly announced the laying of mines nor issued a
warning to international shipping. Even if the mines were not directed against the
effort to deliver humanitarian supplies, but were employed merely as a method of
naval warfare applied against the rebels, the minelaying was still unlawful because
it was conducted in disregard of the right of innocent passage of other States.
The law of non-international armed conflict does not prohibit the laying of naval mines in the internal waters or in the territorial sea of the State. The law recognizes that naval mines serve legitimate purposes, to include area denial, coastal
defense and maintaining and enforcing a blockade?' Of course, indiscriminate attacks, i.e., "attacks that are not specifically directed" against lawful targets,75 the use
of weapons that are indiscriminate by nature16 and the indiscriminate use of weapons11 are prohibited both in international and in non-international armed conflict.
The fact that naval mines may equally hazard military objectives and civilian objects
is not sufficient in itself to conclude that the laying of mines is in violation of any of
these prohibitions. Moreover, the law of naval mine warfare contains a specific rule
on indiscriminate attacks, by explicitly prohibiting the use of "free-floating mines,
unless they are directed against a military objective and they become harmless
within an hour after loss of control over them."18
IfMisurata had constituted a rebel stronghold, it would have been lawful to cut
it off from outside resupply. However, the laying of naval mines by the Gaddafi
forces was illegal because it occurred in disregard of the obligation to take all feasible precautions fo r the safety of peaceful shipping19 (the fa ilure to provide notification to the international comm unity) and of the obligation to provide for
humanitarian relief consignments. With regard to relief consignments, the parties
to an armed conflict are obliged to provide for their free passage if the civilian
population is "inadequately provided with food and other objects essential for its
survival."8(/ While this obligation originated in the law of blockade it is, I would assert, customary in character as a specification of the principle of humanity.
In conclusion, the use of naval mines in non-international armed conflict neither is expressly prohibited nor ab initio violates the principle of distinction or the
rules of the law of non-international armed confli ct prohibiting indiscriminate attacks. It must be borne in mind, however, that this is true only if naval mines are
laid within the internal waters or, subject to prior notification, the territorial sea of
the State. In sea areas beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea, naval mines may
be used by the parties to a non-international armed conflict only if they are directed against a military objective.
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D. The Natural Environment
The Customary In ternational Humanitarian Lawstudy states that "[iJt can be argued
that the obligation to pay due regard to the environment [in international armed
conflicts J also applies in non-international armed conflict if there are effects in another State."81 Although the arguments are based on the law of peace, i.e., international environmental law, this may be a correct statement of the law because there
is no rule of general international law that would absolve a State of its obligations
vis-a.-vis other States under either general international law or international environmentallaw merely because that State has become a party to a non-international
armed conflict.
Unfortunately, the study fails to be sufficiently dear as to who is bound by the
obligation to pay due regard. The commentary only refers to obligations of States;
it does not clarify whether non-State actors are also bound by it. The failure to
indicate that non-State actors are bound may be correct, because there are good
reasons to assume that the obligations under international environmental law exclusively apply to States as subjects of international law.
Far more interesting than the reference to the obligation to pay due regard to the
natural environment beyond the territory of the State is the following conclusion
by the leRC:
[Tlhere are indications that this customary rule [i.e., the duty to pay due regard] may
also apply to parties' behaviour within the State where the armed conflict is taking
place. Some support for drafting a treaty rule for this purpose existed during the negotiation of Additional Protocol II. It was not adopted then, but the general acceptance of
the applicability of international humanitarian law to non-international armed conflicts has considerably strengthened since 1977. In addition, many environmental law
treaties apply to a State's behaviour within its own territory. There is also a certain
amount of State practice indicating the obligation to protect the environment thaI applies also to non-international armed conflicts, including military manuals, official
statements and the many submissions by States to the International Court oOustice in
the Nuclear Weapons case to the effect that the environment must be protected for the
benefit of all.112
It is to be noted that this statement is characterized by cautious formulations"indications," "may also apply," "some support," "certain amount of State practice"-that indicate that the authors of the study are less than convinced of the correctness of their assumptions. In any event, those formulations do not distract
from the suggestion that the authors were guided by their political and ecological
aspirations, rather than by a sound analysis of State practice. State practice during
non-international armed conllicts does not provide sufficient evidence to
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determine that the parties to the conflict are obliged to take into consideration---or
to pay due regard to-the natural environment of the State in which the conflict is
occurring.
It should also be noted that there still is no generally accepted definition of the
term "natural environment. "83 But even if there were agreement that. for example.
certain sea areas or marine living resources constitute "natural environment," this
would not have an impact on the lawfulness of naval operations during a noninternational armed conflict that have, or may have, detrimental effects on the
marine environment of the State concerned.

Part N . Interference with the Navigation of Other States
The law of non-international armed conflict contains no prohibitions going beyond those applying to land or air operations with regard to naval operations of the
parties that occur within the internal waters and the territorial sea of the State party
to the conflict so long as they do not interfere with the navigation of other States.
State practice during the Spanish Civil War and the Algerian conflict seems to
provide convincing evidence that the parties to a non-international armed conflict
are not allowed to interfere with the navigation of other States in sea areas beyond
the outer limit of the territorial sea (unless such measures are lawful under the law
of the sea or general international law). This finding is certainly correct as concerns
measures taken by non-State actors. As regards interference by government forces
one author has taken the position that
the right of states to implement measures against neutral vessels in NIACs is thus at
best an unsettled questio n. The most one can say is that in higher-intensity conflicts
states have sometimes acknowledged or acquiesced in blockades targeting non-state
actors .... However, in equally violent conflicts such a right has sometimes not been recognised and attempts to assert rights of blockade or similar measures have been protested (for instance, the Spanish Civil War and the Algerian rebellion). Where such
measures are protested as contrary to international law those protests must weigh
against the conclusion that there is opinio juris supporting the rule of custom invoked.
On the basis of relevant state practice one can at most hazard a suggestion that irrespective of the preciseelassification of a conflict, states are likely to tolerate the assertion of a
blockade only in cases of higher-intensity conflicts o n a par with the traditional understanding of war."14

A. Neutral Vessels and Aircraft as Lawful Targets
It must be emphasized that the doubts expressed with regard to the authority of the
State party to a non-international armed conflict to interfere with neutral vessels
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and aircraft have only concerned measures short of attack, i.e., visit, search and
capture, and blockade. To date there has been no study addressing the question of
whether foreign vessels and aircraft may qualify as lawful targets under the law of
non-international armed conflict.
If the definition oflawful military objectives in an international armed conflict
also applies in non-international armed conflict,8S there is no convincing reason
that would justify its limitation to vessels and aircraft of the nationality of the State
concerned. Accordingly, any vessel, regardless of the flag it is flying, and any aircraft, wherever registered, used by an organized armed group in the course of a
non-international armed conflict for military purposes constitute lawful military
objectives by either their nature or use. If, for instance, another State comes to the
assistance of the government forces, the warships and military aircraft deployed by
that State will qualify as lawful military objectives by their nature. If the government of the State party makes use of vessels operated by a private military/security
company that flies the flag of another State, that vessel will be a lawful target by reason of its use. In such cases, it does not make a difference whether the vessel or aircraft is encountered in the territorial sea or national airspace or in sea areas beyond
the outer limit of the territorial sea or in international airspace. It is unimaginable
that the parties to a non-international armed conflict will refrain from attacking
such vessels or aircraft simply because they have departed the territorial sea or
national airspace. It is equally unimaginable that other States will protest attacks on
such vessels and aircraft on the sole basis of the attacks' occurring on the high seas
or in international airspace.
The correctness of these findings cannot be questioned even in view of the practice of States during the Spanish Civil War, during which the parties to the 1937
Nyon agreement were not prepared to recognize a right of the parties to that
armed conflict "to exercise belligerent rights orto interfere with merchant ships on
the high sea even if the laws of warfare at sea are observed. "86 The fact that those
States were not prepared to recognize the exercise of belligerent rights, including
attacks on neutral merchant vessels qualifying as lawful targets, does not mean that
the law of non-international armed conflict is the same today. While the law as it
stood in 1937 may have contained a prohibition preventing the parties to a non international armed conflict from exercising belligerent rights on the high seas,
this is no longer the case under the contemporary law of non-international armed
conflict. The customary definition of lawful military objectives contains no exceptions for objects that have the nationality of foreign States.
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B. Visit, Search and Capture
The interceptions of foreign vessels conducted by the French Navy during the Algerian conflict met strong resistance from affected flag States. France, however, was
less than impressed and continued to intercept fo reign merchant vessels for years.
O'Connell rightly observes that since the nineteenth century there had not
been such an extensive invasion- for security reasonS---Qf the principle of the freedom
of the seas as in the case of the Algerian operation. The large number of ships affected,
and the large number of countries which became diplomatically involved, would have
led o ne to imagine that more attention would have been paid to this situation. Since
only a few ships had their cargoes removed, and those ships were dearly engaged in the
smuggling of arms into Algeria, the operation did not seriously affect the navigation of
the high sea, and this, together with the political situation prevailing, would seem to explain the reticence o n the part ofllag States of the ships affected with respect to demands
of the French governmen t. The fact that France was able for so long and in so extensive a
manner to exercise naval power on the high seas on the ground of self-defence causes one
to ponder on the extent to which a conselVative appreciatio n of international law has a
role in defence planning.111

There is also the question of the Israeli blockade of Gaza. As will be discussed in
Part IV.C, it is the view of this author that the conflict should be classified as an international armed conflict. However, it is also useful to consider what the legal position would have been ifit were considered to be non-international in nature, as it
is by some scholars.
Beginning in 2008, and continuing until the establishment of the blockade of
the Gaza Strip on January 3, 2009, Israel exercised the right of visit and search in
order to prevent the flow of arms into the Gaza Strip. The few measures taken
against foreign vessels that were suspected, upon reasonable grounds, of being engaged in the transportation of arms destined for Hamas did not give rise to strong
protests. Either the flag States implicitly recognized Israel's security interests or
they simply did not want to admit that ships flying their flags had been engaged in
the smuggling of arms and ammunition. Whatever the rationale, there is a clear
parallel to the Algerian operation insofar as security interests and the right of selfdefense may serve as a justification for interference with foreign shipping by the
State party to a non-international armed conflict.
Both the Algerian and Gaza conflicts seem to justify the conclusion that the State
party to a non-international armed conflict-not the non -State actor-is entitled
to intercept foreign vessels on the high seas if the following conditions are met:
(1) vital security interests of the State are at stake;
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(2) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the foreign vessels are engaged in activities jeopardizing those security interests (e.g., by supplying
the non-State party with arms); and
(3) the measures are undertaken in close proximity to the conflict area.
It must be emphasized that the recognition of the right of interception (visit,
search and capture) does not imply recognition of the right to exercise measures
short of attack under prize law. Prize law stricto sensu only applies in international
armed conflicts. Rather, the legal basis is found in the right of self-defense or in the
customary right of self-preservation in order to protect the territorial and political
integrity of the State. This right is equally exercisable in an international or noninternational anned conflict. The finding by the International Court of Justice in
the Wall advisory opinion that the right of self-defense does not apply if there is no
trans-border element88 has no basis in State practice.
C. Blockade: The Gaza Case
J. General Considerations
Unaddressed thus far is the question of whether the parties to a non-international
armed conflict are entitled to establish and enforce a naval or aerial blockade.
Blockades are, by necessity, established in international waters or international
airspace, apply to all vessels or aircraft regardless of their nationality,89 and are distinguished from more limited actions such as measures undertaken with the objective of preventing exit from or entry into a given part of the coast or a port
controlled by the other party to a non-international armed conflict. These latter
measures do not qualify as a blockade under the law of anned conflict as long as
they are limited to the territorial sea of the State, or are not applied against foreign
vessels or aircraft.
As noted previously in the context of the American Civil War, it may be the
declaration of a blockade by the government as an implicit recognition ofbelligerency of the non-State party to the conflict that triggers the applicability of the law
of international armed conflict and, thus, of the law of naval warfare.90
If, however, the declaration of blockade cannot be understood as an implicit
recognition of belligerency--either because the concept is no longer recogn ized
as being part of the lex lata or because the circumstances surrounding the declaration do not justify a conclusion to that effect-it is doubtful whether the State
party to a non-international armed conflict is entitled to establish and enforce a
blockade. One author who classifies the conflict between Israel and Hamas as a
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non-international armed conflict has come to the conclusion that in view of the
sporadic, on-again, off-again nature of the hostilities, "Israel had no right to impose a blockade on the Gaza Strip and its enforcement of that unlawful blockade
against the flotill a ... was an act incurring state responsibility.''91 According to that
author's view, "there is no consistent state practice and opinio juris suggesting
blockade is available outside an [international armed conflict J."92 While that
writer's opinion of the legality of the Israeli blockade is not shared by this author, it
is a correct statement of the contemporary law that, absent recognition ofbelligerency, the parties to a non-international armed confli ct are not entitled to establish
and enforce a naval or aerial blockade against foreign vessels or aircraft.
2. The Gaza Case

The legal classification of the Gaza conflict is a contested issue. Those international
lawyers who deal with the subject in a serious manner 93 and hold that Israel's
blockade of the Gaza Strip is illegal arrive at that conclusion because they characterize the conflict as a non-international armed conflict.94 Even if that characterization is correct, their finding that the blockade is therefore unlawful does not
necessarily foll ow, because recognition of belligerency continues to be a valid concept. The mere fact that a given rule or concept of international law has not been
made use of for an extended period does not mean that the rule or concept has become void by reason of desuetude. 95 There is no evidence that States, by refraining
from recognizing a status of belligerency, have abolished that concept for good.
Rather, States are unwilling to bring into operation the legal consequences that
flo w from a recognition of belligerency, but by the very study of the consequences
they acknowledge that the concept is alive and well.
However, while this author accepts that others have reached a contrary position,
the Gaza conflict cannot be classified as a non-international armed conflict. There
are convincing reasons to conclude that it is an international armed conflict in view
of the continuing belligerent occupation.96 The Supreme Court of Israel does not
share this opinion, because, according to the Court, Israel, since the 2005 disengagement, no longer exercises effective control over the Gaza Strip.97 The Court,
however, takes the position that international hwnanitarian law applies to an
armed conflict between Israel and terrorist organizations not merely in an area that
is subject to occupation, but "in any case of an armed conflict of an international
character-in other words, one that crosses the borders of the state -whether or
not the place in which the armed conflict occurs is subject to a belligerent occupation."98 Thus the Court reaches the same conclusion, albeit by a different route
than belligerent occupation.

228

W olffHeintschell'on Heinegg
The Turkel Commission, which was established by the Israeli government to
examine the circumstances surrounding the boarding of the Mavi Marmara on
May 31, 2010, concurred with the Supreme Court that the conflict in the Gaza
St rip is "international in character."99 Additionally, the Commission took into
consideration ( 1) the degree of de facto control that Hamas exercises over the
Gaza Strip, (2) the significant security threat that Hamas presents, and (3)
Hamas's attempts to import weapons, ammunition and other military supplies by sea.
The Commission then cond uded that it "would have considered applying the
rules governing the imposition and enforcement of a naval blockade even if the conflict between Israel and the Gaza Strip had been dassified as a non-international
armed conflict. "1(10
The Palmer Report, which was prepared by the panel appointed by the UN
Secretary-General to examine the boarding of the Mavi Mamlara, also conduded
that the conflict was international in nature, stating:
The Panel considers the confiict should be treated as an international o ne for the purposes
of the law of blockade. This takes foremost into account Israel's right to self-defence
against armed attacks from outside its territory. In this context, the debate on Gaza's
status, in particular its relationship to Israel, should not obscure the realities. The law
does not operate in a political vacuum, and it is implausible to deny that the natu re of
the armed violence between Israel and Hamas goes beyond purely domestic matters. In
fact, it has all the trappings of an international armed conflict. wI

The findings of the Turkel Commission and the Secretary-General's panel lend
further support to the government of Israel's determination that it was entitled to
establish the naval blockade.
A naval blockade is a lawful method of naval warfare . 102 As such, it overrides the
peacetime right of all States to freely navigate in the high seas areas covered by the
blockade. ,03 The blockading power is not only entitled to prevent vessels fro m either
entering or leaving the blockaded area, but, in fact, has an obligation to achieve that
,
goal by ensuring the blockade is effective. 1}4 The blockading power must use whatever means it has available to prevent entry and exit of all vessels; if it fa ils to do so
the blockade becomes ineffective and legally void. In other words, if the blockading
power permits some vessels to cross the blockade, while denying that ability to
other vessels, it is not effectively enforcing the blockade. In the absence of an effective blockade, any interference with the navigational rights of vessels would be unlawful. Hence, if the Israeli government wishes to maintain the naval blockade of
Gaza, it has no choice but to prevent all vessels from either entering or leaving the
blockaded area.
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Under the international law of naval blockade, all vessels, irrespective of the flag
they fly, must be prevented from entering or leaving the blockaded area. In this instance, if they breach the blockade by crossing the blockad e line twenty nautical
miles off the Gaza coastline, or if they attempt to breach the blockade, they are liable to capture or to any other measure taken by blockading units to prevent a continuation of their voyage. lOS
On some occasions it may be difficult to establish an attempt to breach the
blockade. That is not the case with the "Gaza flotilla." The organizers had expressly
stated their intent to b reach the blockade and the vessels' approach to the blockaded area constituted an attempted breach of blockade. Given the expressed intent
and the approach of the vessels, the Israeli Defense Force u nits did not need to wait
to act until the vessels were either close to the blockade line o r crossing it. Rather,
they were entitled to take the necessary measures at a considerable distance because
the attempt to breach the blockade was obvious. 106
Vessels either breaching or attempting to breach a naval blockade must comply
with all legitimate orders by the blockading power. If summoned to stop they may
not contin ue their voyage nor attemp t to escape. They are obligated to let a board ing team on the vessel and to allow the team to take control of the ship. Any act of
escape or resistance may be overcome by the use of p roportionate force, including,
if necessary, the use of deadly force. 107
Humanitarian considerations playa role in d etermining the lawfulness of a
blockade. A naval blockade is unlawful if " the damage to the civilian population is,
or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated from the blockade."los "Excessive" does not mean "extensive." Applied to the blockade of the Gaza Strip, there can be no doubt that it has
resulted in inconveniences for the civilian population, but certainly not in excessive dam age. In this context it is important to no te that the military advan tage
gained, Le., the prevention of the flow of arms and the entry of terrorists, is quite
substan tial.
Moreover, the blockading power is obliged to provide fo r relief consignments
if the civilian population of the blockaded area is no longer adequately provided
with goods essential for its sUlvival, i.e., with food, water and medical supplies. 109
The "Gaza flotilla" was allegedly on a purely h umanitarian mission to p rovide the
civilian pop ulation in Gaza with such essential goods. It is imm aterial whether this
was true, whether the cargoes indeed consisted of essential goods only or whether
the flotilla was only pursuing political and provocative goals. Even if the flotilla
had been on a purely humanitarian mission it would have had no right to approach the Gaza coastline. Rather, the blockading power could prescribe "the
technical arrangements, induding search, under which the relief consignments are
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permitted."110 It is important to note that, in 2010, the Israeli government was prepared to allow the shipment of the flotilla's cargo to Gaza under the condition that
it was un10aded in an Israeli port and its distribution entrusted to the United Nations. That proposal was well in accordance with the applicable law. The mere
claim of pursuing humanitarian goals or to be a humanitarian organization does
not give rise to a right to breach a blockade. Any refusal to accept reasonable technical arrangements offered by the blockading power and any continuation of the
voyage without complying with the legitimate orders of the blockading power will
entitle the latter to take appropriate and proportionate measures, including the use
of force, to prevent the vessels from entering the blockaded area.

Conclusion
It has been shown that the parties to a non-international armed conflict are not
obliged to confine the armed hostilities to the land territory of the State and that
they may make use of recognized methods and means of naval warfare. As long as
the measures they take against each other have no detrimental impact on international navigation and aviation there are no considerable legal obstacles.
While there seems to be widespread agreemen t that neither party to a noninternational anned conflict is entitled to interfere with foreign shipping and aviation in sea areas beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea, the State party to a
non-international armed conflict continues to enjoy the right to enforce its domestic law under the law of the sea. Moreover, it would be difficult to maintain
that the definition of lawful military objectives that undoubtedly applies in noninternational armed conflicts ceases to be valid merely by reason of the geographical position of the target. Hence, foreign vessels and aircraft that contribute to
the enemy's military action by, for example, providing targeting data are lawful
targets even if they are located on the high seas or in international airspace.
As regards measures short of attack, i.e., visit, search and capture, States seem to be
prepared to tolerate such measures if taken by the State party to a non-international
anned conflict, if vital security interests are at stake and if the interception measures
are taken in the vicinity of the coast. Similar considerations may apply if the State
party decides to establish and enforce a naval blockade.
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